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MR. JUSTICE STONE AND THE SPIRIT
OF THE COMMON LAW
MOSES J. ARoNsoN
The Anglo-American system of common law presents to the philosophical
student of human history the challenge of an enigma, the mystery of a
miracle. Uncreated by regal fiat, it nevertheless vibrates with a life all
its own; threatened with extinction by competing systems, Chinese-like it
invariably absorbs the invader for its own greater glory. The common law
plunges its millenary roots into the era of feudal agriculturalism, yet it
flourishes in the shadow of skyscrapers, and is fertilized by the black soot
of steel-mills. Changing and yet unchanged for a thousand years, hoary with
age yet contemporaneous in effectiveness, it seems to defy the rhythm of
growth and decay. What can be the secret of its enduring vitality? By
what device does the common law manage to ward off every attack and
emerge revivified from the conflict?
No inquiry is fraught with greater significance, no investigation laden
with greater consequence for the future development of our civilization than
this one concerning the nature of our common law heritage. For once again
a formidable attack has been launched against the traditional system of
American law. To the front lie the serried ranks of those who would re-
place the common law by the rigidities of a code, while harassing the flanks
move the newly arrived cohorts of those who would substitute for the tried
values of legal supremacy the vagaries of bureaucratic arbitrariness. Against
the opponents on all sides, no contemporary jurist has held the field for
the common law more valiantly than Mr. Justice Stone. In his scholarly
writings and in his judicial opinions, for over a period of three decades, he
has interpreted the genius of the common law as a pattern of thought, a
way of judicial behavior, and an ethical force woven into the warp and
woof of our national life. By example more persuasively even than by
precept he demonstrates that our legal system is far from moribund; and
in these parlous days of ethical and intellectual' frustration, when to re-valu-
ate old values is not only a duty but a necessity, it may be profitable to
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examine Mr. Justice Stone's philosophy of law and civilization for the in-
sight and also for the inspiration that may be derived therefrom.'
II
It is one of the paradoxes of human nature that we tend either to deify
or to desecrate the objects of our interest. Inveterately romantic, we either
elevate human phenomena to the unreal heights of sanctity or else debase
them to the equally unreal depths of limbo. No subject has suffered more
from this trait of human perversity than jurisprudence. In its long history
law has been made to run the gamut of definitions from the divine to the
diabolical, from the ineffably oracular at Sinai to the morbidly psycho-
analytic at Yale.
That the law is neither superhuman nor subhuman is the belief of Mr.
Justice Stone. He recognizes that legal institutions arise and develop in
the course of history. They are rooted in society, and bear the cumulative
impress of experience. "After all," says Mr. Justice Stone, "law is the
product of human experience. Into its warp and woof have entered human
interests, human needs, human emotions, and notions of ethics and philosophy
which are the product of our racial experience."'2 That this essentially
human-and humane-characteristic of the law has tended in recent years
to be minimized may perhaps be explained in no small measure by the
triumphant development of the physical sciences with their theoretical em-
phasis upon mechanism and,their concomitant practical extension in the field
of automatic appliances. "The extraordinary development of the mechani-
cal side of our civilization," suggests Mr. Justice Stone, "has perhaps given us
our mechanistic philosophy of social institutions."3  It would be erroneous
to infer from this, however, that he underestimates the achievements of
science or that he contemns the truth-seeking spirit which animates it. "With-
out abatement of the scientific spirit," he admonishes, "we can do much to
humanize law and law study." 4 What Mr. Justice Stone wishes to empha-
size is that the law need not be enthralled to a narrow conception of science,
and that it should be permitted to unfold itself in keeping with its own in-
herent genius, guided by a philosophy that is faithful to the lessons of
'The immediate occasion of this discussion is the recent publication of a selected group
of Mr. Justice Stone's opinions entitled PUBLic CONTROL OF BusINEss. New York:
Howell, Soskin. 1940. For the purposes of this article, however, only Mr. Justice Stone's
writings in theoretical jurisprudence have been drawn upon.
2H. F. Stone, Introduction to F. C. HIcKs, MEN AND BooKs FAmOUS IN THE LAW(1921) 11-12.
'H. F. Stone, Obedience to Law and Social Change in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR Asso-
CIATION OF NEw HAMPSHIRE (1925) 37.
H. F. Stone, Introduction to F. C. HIcKs, MEN AND BooKs FAMoUs IN THE LAW
(1921) 12.
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history and responsive to the exigencies of an ever-changing civilization.
Envisaged from a thoroughgoing humanistic perspective the law is seen
to be, in the words of Justice Holmes, "the witness and external deposit
of our moral life." 5 And any adequate definition of the legal aspect of
society, as Mr. Justice Stone dearly sees, would involve nothing less than
a systematic philosophy of civilization. "Since law is an essential element
in and a product of social organization," he asseverates, "any complete
definition of law would be impossible without a complete theory of society." 6
Organically related to every other aspect of human life, the law would be
relegated to the status of a ghostly epiphenomenon, a formal mockery, were
it divested of that content of pathos and bathos, of the sublime and the
ridiculous which constitutes the life of the workaday world. A proper under-
standing of the law necessitates envisaging it in all its inter-relationships. 7
To recognize that the law derives from and effects the entire social environ-
ment does not necessarily imply that it cannot be theoretically differentiated
from other institutionalized functions. The law is not co-extensive with
the community as,a whole. Even in a totalitarian state many areas of neces-
sity escape specifically legal control. Even the Inquisition bit off more than
it was able to chew. The law may order a man to smile and shout Heil;
it cannot compel him to parallel that muscular exercise with a joyous senti-
ment in his heart. The law may order a wife to share her husband's couch;
it cannot constrain her to love him. And contrariwise no cause of action
lies against a spouse for bestowing her heart at a distance upon numerous
heroes of the silver screen." There are limits to the scope of legal efficacious-
ness. In its very nature as a utilitarian instrument, the law can hardly be
more than the "external deposit" of the moral life-a relatively superficial
force moving on the political surface of civilization. Like the state itself, the
immediate source of its power, the legal institution functions well to the ex-
tent that it is nourished by the wellsprings of public conscience.
Considerations of this kind may perhaps serve to explain why Mr. Justice
Stone is inclined to follow Professor John Chipman Gray in distinguishing
between the nature and the sources of the lawv, and in defining the former
as "the sum total of all those rules of conduct for which there is state sanc-
10. W. HOLmES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 170.1H. F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATioN (1915) 3.
'I would like to guard against being misconstrued as denying any value whatsoever to
the formal approach to the study of the law. Doubtless the formal approach may in some
instances prove a most serviceable pedagogical device. In this discussion we are con-
cerned, however, with a definition of the law as a human phenomenon in its actual
social context.
'Said Chief Justice Bryan, one of the early English judges: "The thought of man
shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man." Quoted by
H. F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1915) 33.
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tion." 9 Remove the political organization known as the state, and humanity
in its myriad patterns of more or less enduring consociation remains.
Slightly effected perhaps by this operation, the manners and customs, the
folkways and folklore of the people will nevertheless survive essentially un-
touched. One thing, however, will be lacking: a consciously formulated
body of precepts for ironing out inevitable disputes, vested in an organized
group endowed with the power to interpret and enforce these established
rules of human relationship.
It is not necessary to subscribe to Hobbes' over-fearful imagination of a
bellun amniumn contra omnes in order to recognize that because of the com-
plexities of modern life the concept of law would lose all realistic significance
were it not predicated on the safe existence of the state in the background of
judicial behavior. The state sanctions but does not itself to any considerable
degree supply the content of the law. That content, as was seen, the law
derives from the same source wherefrom the state itself receives its cre-
dentials, namely from the underlying nores and the circumambient climate
of opinion. In differentiating it from etiquette, custom, religion and ethics,
Mr. Justice Stone merely yields to the requirements of an ineluctable division
of social labor, without in any way loosening the law from its moorings in
the total life of the community.
III
The recognition that law is a function of the culture of any given epoch
conjures up one of the most central and baffling paradoxes of jurisprudence.
Humanity, like all the other aspects of nature, changes as it floats on the
stream of time. The temporal process, however, operates cumulatively, and
is oblivious of the mathematical divisions inscribed on the artificially con-
trived calendar. In its spontaneous flux, time brands with no perceptible
symbols the interwoven stages of its continuous passage. To the crudely
conceptualized observation of the student of social phenomena, history of
necessity presents the spectacle of a fait acconpli. It is only after a change
has already occurred that in our finitude we first become aware of it. The
dynamic quality of. social growth filters through the finest analytical net,
leaving in the meshes of our intelligence only the crystallized deposit of a
reality that is already past.*
To live in the past while ever moving forward into the future, such is
the poignant paradox of human existence. And from the coils of this para-
dox jurisprudence cannot escape. As an instrument of social control, the
law has no choice but to function within the framework of a culture which
1H. F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1915) 3.
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in its nature constitutes the relatively stabilized backwash of a stream which
itself flows on unceasingly. Doomed to function always in the past, the
law is faced nevertheless with the necessity of adjusting itself to the changes
which the future inevitably brings in its wake. It is this baffling perplexity
which Mr. Justice Stone doubtless has in mind when he says that "the
problem, above all others, of jurisprudence in the modern world is the recon-
ciliation of the demands, paradoxical and to some extent conflicting, that
law shall at once have continuity with the past and adaptability to the present
and the future."' 0 Because the future is as yet unborn, and the past no
longer wholly faithful to the shifting panorama of a civilization in perpetual
motion, the requirement that it be both continuous with the past and adapt-
able to the future places upon the law a burden which is as difficult to bear
in practice as it is perplexing to apprehend in theory.
The foregoing analysis of the paradoxical relationship of law with the
temporal process serves to explain the existence, which it is so fashionable
to denounce, of what may be called a juridical lag. Such denunciations,
however, reflect greater glory upon the generosity of the emotions than upon
the profundity of the intellect which inspires them. For the law is rooted
in the cultural environment, and to be objective in its quest for justice it
must be guided by standards derived from a critical study of the mores of
the community within which it functions. In the words of Mr. Justice Stone,
"law cannot rise above its source in the customs, morals, and social experi-
ence of the people to whom it is to be applied. . . ."11 A cultural phenomenon,
the law derives all its meaning within the context of civilization, and any
effort to transcend the realm of social existence would tend to convert the
law into a mystical aberration bereft of all human significance.
Because the law is thus limited in its scope by the underlying totality of
communal life, it necessarily lags behind the moral values and social ideals
of the group whose disputes it is called upon to conciliate. "It is inevitable,"
writes Mr. Justice Stone, "it is inevitable that law can never realize com-
pletely or keep pace wholly with the moral aspirations of mankind, not only
because they lack that definiteness along their outer boundaries which must
characterize law, but because moral standards must become generally settled
and accepted by society before they can. find expression in law as an estab-
lished rule of conduct. The moral rule must be a settled principle of social
conduct before law can or should attempt to make that principle mandatory
upon all members of the community."' 2 And elsewhere he further elaborates
"H. F. Stone, The Commni Law in the United States in THE FUTURE OF THE CoM-
MoN LAw (Harvard Tercentenary Publications 1937) 129.
H. F. Stone, Obedieme to Law and Social Change in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1925) 34.
"H. F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADmilNISTRATION (1915) 34.
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the same thought when he says that "it is the element of slow maturity, the
necessity for the requisite interval of time for condensation and just appraise-
ment of human experience which .constitute both the strength and weakness
of any system of law. Slow growth gives that toughness of fiber, that solidity
of structure which have made the common law the dependable prop of the
state throughout the English-speaking world. But it is inevitable that at times
in the history of human affairs, the swift progress of events with the attend-
ant accumulation of undigested data of experience should outstrip the develop-
ment of the law, since the necessary process of condensation of our observa-
tion cannot keep pace with an accelerated human experience."' 3  The
juridical lag is not the product of a sinister conspiracy hatched by reactionary
judges, but derives its characteristics from the paradoxes of the temporal
process within which civilization unfolds itself, and results from the very
nature and function of the legal institution as an organ of social control.
Under penalty of the sheerest arbitrariness, the law is obliged to wait for
its standards till the social flux, slowing down as it joins the accumulations
of the past, begins to present an intelligible pattern of normative behavior
for the judge and legislator to apply.
It would be one-sided, however, to place upon the dialectical exigencies
of social evolution the entire blame for the inherent conservatism of law.
Its own inner technique combines with the outer social determinants to put
a brake upon whatever Icarian propensities the common law may harbor.
This technique is of course the one familiar under the name of stare decisis,
and is characterized by the obedience to precedent. "The English common
law which obtains generally in the United States," Mr. Justice Stone re-
minds us, "is a law of precedent. By this is meant that the decision of a
court, when it takes the final form of a judgment, operates not only to dis-
pose of the rights of the parties to the particular litigation pending before it,
but it constitutes a precedent to be followed in the decision of all like cases
which may arise in the future. Every decision is thus an authority which
determines what the law is, and is a source of law to govern future cases.' 14
To follow precedent means to endeavor to bring to bear upon the solution
of a current dispute the cumulative wisdom of preceding generations in so
far as it has proved itself in the solution of similar disputes. Doubtless
abused in many instances by unimaginative judges, the technique of stare
decisis reflects a trait of the rational mind which turns spontaneously for
assistance, when faced by a problematic situation, to those who previously
had acquired experience in dealing with an analogous predicament. For a
"H. F. Stone, Obedience to Law and Social Change in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR
AsSOCIATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1925) 31.
I'M. F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION¢ (1915) 16-17.
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judge to refuse to profit by the experience of his predecessors would be not
only a denial of his own birthright as a rational being; it would be also a
wanton neglect of his duty as a dispenser of justice.
To follow intelligently the method of precedent, it may be affirmed, is
to be guided by experience-by the cumulative experience of the ages. One
need not indulge in fanciful contrasts with civilian systems, nor disparage
their greater architectonic symmetry, in order to appreciate the benefits
which must accrue to the common law as a result of its highly empirical
temper. Since "no rule of the common law is ever formulated or declared
apart from an actual controversy,"'15 and since "the law is applied by a judge
who knows the existing rules of law and who by his study of the case and
by experience in the practice of his profession and as a judge knows how
those rules work in their application to other controversies,"'16 it is to be
expected that judge-made law, based on the creative fusion of reasoned
authority with present experience, will produce a system characterized
simultaneously by realism and certainty.
In legal parlance, as in life generally, certainty does not mean an unfailing
mechanical necessity. It means rather the probable occurrence of a reason-
ably anticipated event. It means regularity and generality within the limits
of human finitude and the framework of shifting circumstances. Legal
certainty means that if all things are equal, and allowing for factors whose
decisiveness are in no two human situations absolutely identical, then a liti-
gant may expect that a decision in his case will not differ arbitrarily from
the decision handed down in a series of similar cases previously adjudicated.
Generality and certainty in the law are ideals that stand opposed to irre-
sponsible impressionism and arrogant subjectivism; they do not symbolize,
as some contemporary caricaturists would have us believe, the quintessence
of judicial automatism, nor would they inspire the rationalization into a
legal principle of the mechanical behavior of Robots.
The common law technique of a critical interpretation of precedent satis-
fies the legitimate craving for a reasonable degree of stability in human
affairs, and thus fills a social need which is not without a moral value. "As
civilization becomes more advanced, and social organization becomes more
complex," writes Mr. Justice Stone, "the greater becomes the necessity for
a system of law which shall be reasonably certain in its application to the
usual affairs of the citizen. Uncertainty in law, when it occurs in the mod-
ern state, results necessarily in an inextricable confusion in which loss and





estimating those practical and ethical benefits which the technique of stare
decisis makes possible, it should be obvious, however, that this precedent-
following technique, so native to the common law, unconsciously tends in
its effect to widen beyond necessity the gap between judge-made law and the
ever-changing conditions of social life; while in its reliance upon authority
as well as experience it also operates quite paradoxically to breed within its
own empirical system the very multiplicity of contradictory rules which the
common law, by its allegiance to precedent, endeavored to avoid. Fearful
of transcending the realm of the known and the knowable, the common law
runs the risk of forgetting that the past is itself a growing area to which the
future is constantly adding new fringes, and that a proper respect for prece-
dent does not necessitate a supine worship of authority when under the
stress of changed circumstances it loses its social utility. Imperceptibly the
dynami6 aspect of stare decisis tends to be overlooked, and as a result we
are confronted no longer by a necessary lag between law and culture, but
by a mass of archaic rules and principles which are as baneful to the legal
system as they are unjustifiable. By a similar process, due to the slacken-
ing of judicial vigilance, does the respect for precedent tend to yield chaos
instead of order, eccentricity instead of generality. Under the stress of
experience, with the passage of time, certain rules are bound to lose their
authoritative significance; yet to these enfeebled precepts we continue to pay
an empty homage. Thus contradictory rules begin to pullulate in the body
of judge-made law, and instead of a source of order and certainty, prece-
dents tend to become a cause of anarchy and confusion. So true is it that
even the best human devices threaten in the long run to negate their own
purposes, and serve to enhance evils which in their original condition are not
wholly without a justification.
IV
That the common law, like any human achievement, is far from a Platonic
archetype of immutable perfection; and that the shortcomings of our legal
system can and must be eliminated, no contemporary jurist is keener to
recognize than Mr. justice Stone. Imbued with a more discriminating ad-
miration than Sir John Fortescue who in his De Laudibus Legum Anglie
waxed so far ecstatic as to exclaim that "there is not pretense to say or in-
sinuate to the contrary but that the laws and customs of England are not only
good but the very best . . .you must acknowledge them to be not only good
laws but such in all respects as you yourself could not wish them to be bet-
ter," Mr. Justice Stone, sobered by five centuries of experience, is impelled
more calmly to avow that "as practicing lawyers we are accustomed to think
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of the law as an almost changeless and permanent thing, and yet our knowl-
edge of the history of the common law reminds us that its story has been
one of change and progress which has been greatly accelerated in times of
rapid social and economic change."'18 A human institution, the law is sub-
ject to all the imperfections and all the vicissitudes to which the flesh is pro-
verbially heir. By the same token it is amenable to all the ameliorations
which the ingenuity of man can devise for the improvement of the human
lot. Man is indeed the measure of all things legal.
The' juridical lag is to some extent an inevitability; it is not a virtue. The
past, to be sure, is continuous with the present and the future, so that "in
law as in other human affairs we forget and place at hazard the future when
we disregard the past."'19 The necessity of taking into account the achieve-
ments of the past before leaping into the future does not imply, however, a
passive acceptance of outworn authority;' nor does it carry with it the obli-
gation to walk unswervingly within the limits traced by the hands of the
honored dead. "History is more than a catalog of events," declares Mr.
Justice Stone, "history is more than a catalog of events or an appeal to
precedent. Rightly viewed and used, it is the record of the past, measured
and valued in terms of progress. Knowledge of how that progress has
been achieved, as well as insight into the nature and effect of those influences
which have hindered and on occasion have thwarted it, is the beginning of
that wisdom with which we may hope to insure the progress of the future."2 0
Precedents are valuable not as archaeological curiosities, but as the cumu-
lative dictates of experience, as shortcuts to social control. Precedents lose
their juridical prerogatives to the extent that in the course of human develop-
ment they cease to serve the cause of progress.
The plethora of conflicting and archaic rules stemming from a mechanical
application of stare decisis does not make for legal progress. Accumulating
empirically in response to the specific needs of individual controversies,
growing in rank profusion under the protection of what may be called an
unconscious theory of juristic laissez faire, bereft of any internal principle of
coherence, the rules pronounced in each isolated case inevitably developed
with the passing of the centuries into a congeries of contradictory and often
inconsequential precepts. Thus the very strength of the common law, its
pragmatic empiricism, turned out to be its greatest weakness, and militated
23H. F. Stone, Changing Order and Responsibility of the Bar in NEw JERsEY BAR
Ass'N YEAR Boo (1921) vol. II, p. 53.
"H. F. Stone, Obedience to Law and Social Change in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR
ASSOCIATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1925) 39.
'H. F. Stone, Review of W. W. COOK, CASES AND OTHER AuTHO=1onrs ON EQuITY
in (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 646.
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against that quality of certainty which was its proudest boast. "Every new
citation," cautions Mr. Justice Stone, "every new digest, every new compila-
tion which we eagerly seize upon to lighten our labors, comes, like Banquo's
ghost, to confront us with the disquieting reality that the common law system
of precedent which our forbears have cherished for some ten centuries
cannot continue indefinitely to develop solely through the medium of re-
ported decisions. '21 Also in jurisprudence laissez faire seems to have failed.
The evils which impair the common law invite constructive reform; they
do not spell bankruptcy. The presence of anachronisms testifies to the
inescapable influence of time's corrosive alchemy; it does not imply that the
legal corpus in its entirety is corrupted. Nor does it follow that any alterna-
tive system would be immune to the same defects which derive from the
dynamic quality of life itself. Hence Mr. Justice Stone is in the forefront
of those who champion a rational restatement of the common law in order
to purge it from inconsistencies and to adapt it more closely to the needs
which the unparalleled social changes of recent years have created. 22
Unlike a code, the Restatement is not repugnant to judge-made law;
rather it is predicated upon the self-corrective and creative potentialities
of the common law. "One of the striking phenomena of the development
of the common law since it was transplanted to these shores," Mr. Justice
Stone notices, "is the ever-accelerated speed with which its boundaries have
been extended, and its content multiplied and refined." This expansion
must be attributed not only to outer legislative forces but also to the inner
flexibility of our legal system itself which responds to judicial guidance, and
yields spontaneously, albeit cautiously, to the changing pressure of en-
lightened public opinion.
The great judges who have guided the common law successfully through
channels encumbered by the d6bris of revolutionary eruptions and seething
under the maelstrom of mass hysteria, were fully aware of the relativity of
human values. They recognized, in the words of Mr. Justice Stone, that
"moral standards vary from generation to generation and that a legal rule
which conformed to the moral standards of one period might fall far short of
'H. F. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification (1923) 23 COL. L.
REV. 319, 320.
"The entire article entitled Some Aspects of the Problems of Law Simplification,
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 319-337, may be said to be a manifesto on behalf of the Restate-
ment which has already proved itself to be of inestimable value. In this connection it
may be interesting to compare Mr. Justice Stone's views with those of his late colleague,
Mr. Justice Cardozo. Cf., A Ministry of Justice and The American Law Institute re-
printed in BENJA MI N. CAsnozo, LAW AND LITERATURE (1931) 41-69, 121-141.
1H. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States in THEE FUTURE OF THE CoM-
MoN LAW (1937) 120; and passim.
MR. JUSTICE STONE
the standards of another." 24 In its inherent power to implement this ethical
relativism lies perhaps the unique secret of the perdurance of the Anglo-
American system of law.
Adapting itself to changing circumstances and values, the law perforce
is obliged to look beyond its own confines. To it does not apply the poet's
injunction:
"Veux-tu d~couvrir le monde,
Ferme tes yeux, Rosemonde"-
It is not by introspection that the kaleidoscopic physiognomy of the ex-
ternal world can be discerned. "We ought not to be completely absorbed in
the technique of the law," counsels Mr. Justice Stone. "Who," he asks
rhetorically, "who could ... suppose that law could exist and function sep-
arate and apart from science or from adequate' understanding and apprecia-
tion of the significant facts of modern life which affect social right? The
questions which come to us are rooted in history and in the social and
economic development of the nation. To grasp their significance our study
must be extended beyond the examination of precedents and legal formulas,
by reading and research in fields extra-legal, which nevertheless have an
intimate relation to the genesis of the legal rules which we pronounce."'25
Jurisprudence, to be progressive, must be fertilized by the other social
disciplines.
Envisaged from the broader perspective which a sociologically impregnated
jurisprudence discloses, the law is recognized to be a teleological process
developing with its cultural environment in the deliberate quest for justice.
Faithful to the general tendencies of modern philosophical thought under the
propulsions of the Darwinian influence, the implied stagnant perfectionism
of Coke and Blackstone is rejected for a frankly dynamic viewpoint. Legal
rules are seen to be in the nature of hypotheses or tentative plans of action,
subject to the pragmatic test of social efficacy. In a recently enunciated
passage which leaves very little to be desired, Mr. Justice Stone summarizes
this progressive doctrine which has become familiar under the name of
sociological jurisprudence :26
l'H. F. Stone, Francis Marion Burdick (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 727.
'H. F. Stone, Fifty Years Work of the Supreme Court (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 435.
'The association of the phrase "sociological jurisprudence" with the name of Mr.
Justice Stone necessitates a word of explanation, for on various occasions, especially in
his LAW AND ITs ADmINISTRATION (1915), written when he was Dean of the Columbia
University Law School, he has expressed an unmistakable antipathy to the name, if not
to the doctrine of sociological jurisprudence. With the passing of the years he has
continuously modified and qualified his original antagonism to the doctrine which he
opposed more for the abuses which he feared it might encourage than for its principles.
That he has not hesitated to modify his earlier opinions is of course a tribute to his
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"We are coming to realize more completely that law is not an end,
but a means to an end-the adequate control and protection of those
interests, social and economic, which are the special concern of govern-
ment and hence of law; that that end is to be attained through the
reasonable accommodation of law to changing economic and social needs,
weighing them against the need of continuity of our legal system and the
earlier experience out of which its precedents have grown; that within
the limits lying between the command of statutes on the one hand and
the restraints of precedents and doctrines, by common consent regarded
as binding, on the other, the judge has liberty of choice of the rule
which he applies, and that his choice will rightly depend upon the rela-
tive weights of the social and economic advantages which will finally
turn the scales of judgment in favor of one rule rather than another.
Within this area he performs essentially the function of the legislator,
and in a real sense makes law."21
Legislating within limits set by tradition and insight, the judge is a creative
agent capable of molding the common law according to a philosophical pat-
tern of social well-being. Under his intelligent control the juridical lag
can be reduced to that minimum which inheres in the nature of things alone,
and which sets a rational albeit fugitive term to man's inveterate idealism.
Because the judge does in a genuine sense make law it should not be in-
ferred, however, that his creative activity is as untrammelled as that of the
legislator. While Mr. Justice Stone admits that "the power of appellate
courts to limit or modify the application of rules of law, and in extreme and
exceptional cases to overturn precedents, when wisely and prudently exer-
cised, is the very life of the law,"' s he takes pains to emphasize the dangers
of judicial subjectivism, and invites attention to the fact that "in calling the
written law judge-declared or judge-made law it must not be supposed that
such law represents the mere whim or caprice of the judge who declares
it."29 And he proceeds to explain that "what has led to the overruling of
precedent . . . is not the personal theories of the judges as to what consti-
intellectual integrity. A careful study of all his published writings, including his book
reviews, convinces me, however, that Mr. Stone was always a "sociological jurist"
malgr6 ld, and that his original strictures, while based on a misunderstanding of the
doctrine as expounded by Dean Roscoe Pound, were nevertheless motivated by a legiti-
mate opposition to the dangers of an unbridled juristic impressionism buffeted by gusts of
popular frenzy. Extended interpretations of the doctrine of sociological jurisprudence may
be found in Moses J. Aronson, Cardoao's Doctrine of Sociological Jurisprudence (1938)
4 J. Soc. PHIL. 5-44; and by the same author, The Juristic Thought of Mr. Justice Frank-furter (1940) 5 J. Soc. PHIL. 150-173; Roscoe Pound and the Resurgence of Juristic
Idealism, to be published (October, 1940) J. Soc. PHIL. and Tendencies in American
Jurisprudence, in (Tuly, 1940) U. OF TORONTO L. 3.
-'H. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States in THE FUTURE OF THE
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tutes 'social justice,' but the pressure of facts proven in court which lead
ultimately to the recognition that established precedent does not work well,
either because it does not harmonize with other earlier rules or because of
change of conditions or because it does not square with the settled moral sense
of the community."3 0 Unfelicitous in expression and thus lending itself to the
ravages of what may be called the higher chicanery which constitutes the
besetting curse of so much philosophical literature, Mr. justice Stone's
meaning is nevertheless clear. Without minimizing the necessity of a
lebensanschauung to preside over the choice of conflicting precedents which
must be made as "an appraisal and comparison of social values," 31 he wishes
to bring out that while the legislator "is not bound by existing rules of law,
and is concerned with them only incidentally in connection with the process
of formhulating new law,"232 the judge, on the contrary, in the exercise of his
creative function, is hedged by standards of objectivity which should not be
ignored. Precisely because the legislative function exists, in the words of
the late justice Cardozo, to "eradicate a cancer, right some hoary wrong,
correct some definitely established evil which defies the feebler remedies,
the distinctions and the fictions, familiar to the judicial process,"33 it is all
the more necessary for the judge, in guiding the law, to exercise those
restraints which obviate the dangers of personal whimsicality. Any other
method would produce not legal progress but a tyranny of caprice less tolera-
ble even than the confusion wrought by the anachronisms which it is the
function of the inventive judge to nullify.
V
In the ebb and flow of history, the common law has not always remained
true to those ideals of equity and flexibility which are the secret of its
enduring vitality. Like all things human it has had its moments of lassitude
and inertia. Forgetful of the noble audacity which enabled it to prosper
under the most diverse circumstances, the common law permitted itself to
succumb temporarily in the course of the nineteenth century to the lure of
a deceptive notion of immutable perfection, and the static views of the Cokes
came to triumph over the more dynamic outlook of the Mansfields. 'The
effect of this allegiance to an illusory conception of legal self-sufficiency
coupled with an extravagant interpretation of the principle of the separation
of governmental powers, was to create on the part of judges a peculiar
*'Id. at 47.
'H. F. Stone, The Common Law it; the United States in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMMsON LAW (1937) 127.
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hostility toward statutory enactments. In this unfriendly attitude of judicial
specialization is grounded the superstition, still taught in many law schools
as an elementary truism, that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed. Imbued with a parochial jealousy of its traditional
prerogatives, and dominated by an ideal of static perfection, the judiciary
looked askance at statutes as intruders to be treated with cold courtesy, of
course, but without any hospitality. "The statute was looked upon as in the
law but not of it," complains Mr. Justice Stone, "a formal rule to be
obeyed, it is true, since it is the command of the sovereign, but to be obeyed
grudgingly, by construing it narrowly and treating it as though it did not
exist for any purpose other than that embraced within the strict construction
of its words. ' '3 4 Motivated by a spirit of narrow departmentalism, judge-
made law warred against statutory law, and the legal household became
divided against itself.
Antagonism begets antagonism, and confusion thrives on internal dissen-
sions. The failure of the common law sympathetically to accept and assim-
ilate the fiat of the legislature contributed to the growth of a widespread
attitude of lawlessness which doubtless had its roots in causes more profound
than the technical principle of strict constructionism. The latter was a
factor, however, in slackening the pace of the law at a time when the transi-
tion from an older.order of rural life to a novel industrialism made rapid
legal change particularly imperative. Under these circumstances the undue
rigidity of the common law struck the popular imagination, always ready to
release its emotional energy, and judge-made law entered into a period of
partly justifiable discredit. "It is difficult to appraise the consequences,"
writes Mr. Justice Stone, "it is difficult to appraise the consequences of the
perpetuation of incongruities and injustices in the law by this habit of narrow
construction of statutes- and by the failure to recognize that they are as
significant as recognitions of social needs and rightly as much a part of the
law as the rules declared by judges. A generation ago no feature of our law
administration tended quite so much to discredit law and lawyers in the lay
mind. A narrow literalism too often defeated the purpose of remedial legis-
lation, while a seeming contest went on with the apparent purpose of ascer-
taining whether the legislatures would ultimately secure a desired reform
or the courts would succeed in resisting it."5 In the struggle for supremacy
between the judiciary and the legislature when cooperation was most to be
desired, the ultimate purposes of the law as an instrument of social welfare
went unattained.
'H. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States in TiE FUTURE OF THE




The common law's necessity is the codifier's opportunity. It matters not
that guided by an erroneous eighteenth century philosophy of rationalism
the judges themselves were to blame for the low estate into which the com-
mon law had fallen. To the extent that judicial declarations were discredited
as an instrument of progress, statutes gained in prestige as the expression
of contemporary opinion and as the uniquely potent agency of translating
new social ideals into official legal behavior. "Forgetting that social custom
and the average moral standards of the community are more potent in the
control of human conduct than formal law," deplores Mr. Justice Stone, "we
nevertheless seem to regard statute making as the chief and only ultimate
agency of social reform and the never failing means for 'the minute regula-
tion and control of all human activities."3 6 The center of legal gravity came
to be shifted from courts to legislatures, from judge-made rules to statutes.
Faith in the unbounded efficacy of statutes leads by a logical process finally
to the glorification of a full-fledged code. Oblivious of our own experience
with attempts on a limited scale to codify various branches of commercial
law, and ignoring the lessons taught by the more thoroughgoing experiments
of other countries which, unlike ourselves, move within the orbit of the
Roman law tradition, impetuous reformers, out of the depths of their despair
with the inadequacies of what may be called the muddling characteristic of
the common law, would substitute in its place a corpus juris patterned after
the continental systems. That such a proposed code, by its qualities of in-
ternal consistency would charm the intellect with its esthetic elegance, and
that it would shine with an artificial splendor unknown to the more rugged
and battle-scarred common law, can hardly be gainsaid. Mr. Justice Stone,
however, together with many of the greatest leaders of the Anglo-American
bar and bench is inclined to be skeptical concerning the superior effectiveness
of a code over judge-made law when it comes to the supreme test of social
control in a dynamic civilization. Not only are we faced by the difficulty
which can doubtless be overcome by education that the American lawyer
is not accustomed to the civilian way of thinking and to him codification "has
always been anathema," but a more serious objection resides in a considera-
tion based on our own past experience. Mr. Justice Stone invites attention
to the fact that "the limited codification of commercial law subjects in this
country has not proved so successful a method of law simplification as to
encourage the hope that the other and more complex branches of our law
may generally be simplified by that method."3 7 Between the ideal and its
"H. F. Stone, Obedience to Law and Social Change in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR
AssocIATIoN OF Nsw HAMPSHIRE (1925) 37.
'rH. F. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification (1923) 23 COL.
L. REv. 329.
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realization there is many a slip among creatures burdened with the original
sin of human finitude.
That codification should in the final analysis prove unsuccessful in over-
coming the very difficulties which in the eyes of its sponsors render it neces-
sary, is not to be wondered at. The juridical lag, as was pointed out earlier
in this discussion, is rooted in the very nature of social development. Only
superhuman omniscience can peer into the future and -prepare its reception.
A codified system just as much as the common law would be subject to the
evils of historical myopia. Like the common law during periods of stagna-
tion, a code too would soon be open to the charge of' lagging behind the
culture of its day. "However skilfully performed," admonishes Mr. Justice
Stone, "and whatever learning and experience may be lavished upon it, the
human mind cannot envisage every situation which may arise even in a
well-known or well-understood social order or foresee the variations which
will take place in a changing and increasingly complex civilization. To place
our law after centuries of free development on a Procrustean bed of un-
yielding statutory law would not make for progress. It would only be the
precursor either of stagnation or, what is more probable, of the utter con-
fusion and disorganization which would, result from the struggle of the spirit
of the common law to free itself from its statutory bondage."' 8  Faced by
specific applications which it could not possibly have foreseen, a codified
system would have to call to its rescue the judiciary, and endow it again
with its former common law prerogatives to interpret, to apply and to create
the law. Thus a code would serve but to set in relief the technique of
judge-made law as an indispensable instrumentality of legal adjustment to
continuously changing circumstances.
The alternative to the evils of a code is the creative exercise of the judicial
function under the guidance of a critically alert philosophy of the common
law. Such a philosophy, which solicits the sympathy of Mr. Justice Stone,
would be cognizant of the dynamic forces in society which render constant
adaptation imperative, would predicate its legal reasoning upon a tolerant
acceptance of the major premise of ethical relativism which a realistic
examination of the data of history discloses, and would voluntarily incor-
porate, as an organic part of the common law system the enactments which
articulate the changing social values through the voice of popular legislative
bodies. In the light of a progressive philosophy, common law judges would
recognize, as they have at the low ebb of their career sometimes failed to do,
that "a statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the common law, but
a guest to be welcomed and made at home there as a new and powerful aid
3'Id. at 330.
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in the accomplishment of its appointed task of accommodating the law to
social needs." 39 The common law tradition itself presents favorable prece-
dents for this cooperative attitude, as has been persuasively urged by Dean
Pound and his successor Dean Landis.40 By applying the doctrine of the
"equity of the statute," legislative enactments may be envisaged as sources
of law, just as much the starting point for judicial expansion and adaptation
as any precedent catr be. And thus would be satisfied the need for "the
better organization of judge-made and statute law into a co-ordinated sys-
tem," 41 which nourishes the clamor for codification, in itself as impotent to
counteract the juridical lag as it is repugnant to the Anglo-American tradi-
tion of judicial creativity.
VI
The problem of the relationship between judge-made law and statute
which has been putting the common law to a crucial test such as it has not
had to face since its fateful ordeal in meeting the challenge of equity during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has in recent years become exacer-
bated by a related and analogous perplexity. This newer embarrassment
arises out of the questions raised by the development of administrative com-
missions which overlap in their function the old-established common law
tribunals. Endowed simultaneously with legislative, executive and judicial
prerogatives, these administrative tribunals were called into being to serve
as legal shock troops, so to speak, as highly mobilized agencies, qualified by
their expeditiousness and expertness to tackle more efficiently the highly
complex and rapidly moving situations created by the revolutionary impact
of technology upon industry, and thus to supplement the more cumbersome
albeit more disciplined behavior of the regular courts. "Perhaps the most
striking change in the common law of this country," affirms Mr. justice
Stone, "certainly in recent times has been the rise of a system of adminis-
trative law, dispensed in the first instance through authority delegated to
boards and commissions composed of non-judicial officers." 42 Arbiters of
justice and instruments of law enforcement, it was to be expected that these
novel administrative agencies, infringing as they necessarily do upon a do-
1H. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States in THE FUTURE OF THE
COMtmON LAW (1937) 133-134.
"Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislatwn (1908) 21 Hv. L. Rxv. 383; and
James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of the Law in HARvARD LE.AI. EssAys(1934). See also Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv.
227; and JoHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1938) 152-197.
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main which for a thousand years has been kept under the jealous guardian-
ship of the common law, should disturb the equanimity and arouse the
apprehensions of the judiciary. Reminiscent of the alarm engendered in an
earlier period by the expansion of equity jurisdiction under the pressure of
economic changes and a resurgent ethical consciousness, today the common
law is again caught in the throes of an internal crisis upon the outcome of
which depends its whole future destiny under a democratic scheme of politi-
cal organization.
Just as the pressure of events caused the narrow bonds of ancient writs
and forms of action to expand and combine with the more elastic mdcha-
nisms of equity, so has the same implacable force of social development in
our day outrun the flexibility of a more modern common law, and is chal-
lenging it to quicken its pace and associate its talents with the still more
adaptable devices of administrative law. These newer devices have become
necessary "not by want of an applicable law, but because the ever-expanding
activities of government in dealing with the complexities of modern life had
made indispensable the adoption of procedures more expeditious and better
guided by specialized experience than any which the courts had provided., 4 3
Because the distinction between administrative commissions and judicial trib-
unals resides not so much in substantive law as in procedural practice's and
extra-legal equipment, what is needed for their mutual benefit is a coopera-
tive joining of forces to the end that justice may triumph in our highly
industrialized society honeycombed with gigantic interlocking corporations
and parcelled into myriads of self-estranged groups blindly colliding with one
another.
Like Selden who held that "equity is a roguish thing," for a Chancellor's
conscience, he opined, is as variable as a Chancellor's foot, so many con-
temporary jurists, forgetful that common law judges also have feet,-feet
that vary in degree of nimbleness and also cleanliness,-are inclined to look
adversely upon the new-fangled administrative processes as "roguish things"
fraught with all the dangers of- arbitrariness. Of these real dangers, Mr.
Justice Stone is not unaware. "As lawyers," he admonishes, "we should see
to it that while preserving what is good and efficient in an improved adminis-
trative system, it should be held in check by a procedure which recognizes
that individuals have rights which cannot be ruthlessly over-ridden by bu-
reaucracy."" Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty in administrative law as
much as in any other human enterprise.
'"3Ibid.
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To condemn an institution because it is open to abuse on the part of irre-
sponsible individuals is as futile as it is fallacious. By such a negative argu-
ment Mr. Justice Stone refuses to be seduced. Granted that administrative
commissions have arisen in response to social needs which the common law
has shown itself unable effectively to satisfy under the circumstances of our
peculiarly complex economic system, the question becomes not whether we
are to retain these newer agencies, but rather how to implement them so
that they could perform their function with a minimum of imperfection.
Says Mr. Justice Stone:
"Addresses before bar associations twenty years ago, discussing the rise
of new administrative agencies, are remirfiscent of the distrust of equity
displayed by the common-law judges led by Coke, and of their resist-
ance to its expansion. We still get the reverberations of these early ful-
minations in renewed alarms at our growing administrative bureaucracy
and the new despotism of boards and commissions. So far as these
nostalgic yearnings for an era that has passed would encourage us to
stay the tide of a needed reform, they are destined to share the fate of
the obstacles which Coke and his colleagues sought to place in the way
of the extension of the beneficent sway of equity. These warnings
should be turned to account, not in futile resistance to the inevitable,
or in efforts to restrict to needlessly narrow limits activities which admin-
istrative officers can perform better than courts, but as inspiration to
the performance of the creative service which the bar and courts are
privileged to render in bringing into our law the undoubted advantages
of the new agencies as efficient working implements of government,
but surrounded with every needful guarantee against abuse.
' 45
Like all human devices, like the common law itself, government by com-
mission is bound to present instances of undue arbitrariness and venality.
These evils can be progressively eliminated by the same method of trial and
error, so congenial to the Anglo-American temper, which has enabled the
common law to correct itself contifiuously and to thrive amidst changing
circumstances.
That the system of administrative law as already established constitutes
no peril to our cherished ideals of due process and of the supremacy of law,
seems patent to Mr. Justice Stone. He discerns within the administrative
procedures themselves a spontaneous attempt to safeguard and apply, sub-
ject of course to the exigencies of their special problems, these basic ideals
which are rooted in the mores of our culture. And the history of the move-
ment serves to confirm his optimism. "Looking back over the fifty years
which have passed since the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Com-
'H. F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States in THE FUTURE oF THE
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mission," writes Mr. Justice Stone, "no one can now seriously doubt the
possibility of establishing an administrative system which can be made to
satisfy and harmonize the requirements of due process and the common-law
ideal of supremacy of law, on the one hand, and the demand, on the other,
that government be afforded a needed means to function, freed from the
necessity of strict conformity to the traditional procedure of courts."46 That
the future development of adminstrative law shall not deviate from the
ideals of objectivity and integrity set by the original commissions depends in
the final analysis, as all honest government depends, upon a public opinion
which treasures liberty more than ignominious paternalism, supported by a
bench and bar alert, as the founders of our commonwealth were, "to augur
misgovernment at a distance and snuff the approach of tyranny in every
tainted breeze." 47
Animated by a spirit of orderly progress, respectful of the human per-
sonality, and guided in its quest for justice by the twin criteria of equity
and utility, the common law emerges from an examination of Mr. Justice
Stone's doctrine, as one of the liberating forces of our civilization. Cog-
nizant of the lessons of the past, it permits itself to be adapted constantly
to the exigencies of an ever-changing present. Free from a stultifying
attachment to any doctrinaire absolutes, it is tolerant toward new manners
and new morals as they arise and crystallize out of the potentialities of the
unfolding future. Because it is a system of judge-made law, under the
guidance of judges with disciplined imaginations, it is enabled to reflect the
ethical values which prevail at different times and under different circum-
stances. Implementing its idealism with a pragmatic technique, it controls
the social flux not by erecting walls of exclusion but by drawing circles of
inclusion. Self-corrective and self-denying, it serves the cause of justice
unspectacularly but efficiently. Heeding the voice of enlightened public
opinion and assimilating rational reforms, the common law remains unshaken
before the negative onslaughts of abstract dogmatists and turns to derision
the fevered criticism of impetuous romanticists.
It is in periods of marked transition, like the present, when a new order
is in the process of emerging out of the matrix of the old, that the quali-
ties of the common law stand out in bold relief, and point the way to progress
without violence. It is good at such critical times to examine the teachings
"Id. at 135-136. The entire subject is admirably treated by JOHN DICKINSON, ADfIN-
ISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREmACY OF LAW (1927) ; and JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
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of those leaders who have with their wisdom replenished and with their
integrity sheltered the flame which illumines the way of justice in Anglo-
American civilization. Moreover, the value of such a constructive effort
of interpretation may perhaps be considered to be enhanced at this particu-
lar moment when a different philosophy of law is illuminating its contrasting
way of justice by the light of incendiary bombs and in the glare of bonfires
which once were peace-abiding communities, centers of that complex of
sublimated forces properly known as Christian civilization.
